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THE FUTURE OF CABLE COMMUNICATIONS
AND THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
Tom A. Collins*
The legal basis of the fairness doctrine, as well as that of other affirmative
program regulations of broadcasting, has traditionally rested upon the scar-
city of broadcast frequencies and the consequent intense competition for
broadcast time.' All those who wish to use the electromagnetic spectrum and
have the necessary means are not able to do so because of the phenomenon
of interference. This requires issuance of a limited number of broadcast
licenses and other governmental regulations to create a viable system. In
cable, the reverse applies. Rather than scarcity, abundance of channel
capacity is likely.2 Nevertheless, the fairness doctrine presently applies to
cable.3 Properly structured, cable communications will transmit nearly un-
limited sources of information. Thus the entire theory of the fairness doctrine
as applied to cable communications requires reappraisal.
I. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
Conceptually, the fairness doctrine4 must be divided into two parts. First,
the doctrine generally requires that any broadcaster who raises a controver-
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary. A.B., Indiana University, 1963; J.D., Indiana University, Indianapolis, 1969;
LL.M., University of Michigan, 1970.
1. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), in which the Court
noted:
Before 1927, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sec-
tor, and the result was chaos. It quickly became apparent that broadcast fre-
quencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and ration-
alized only by the Government. . . . Consequently, the Federal Radio
Commission was established to allocate frequencies among competing appli-
cants in a manner responsive to the public convenience, interest, or necessity.
id. at 375-77 (footnotes omitted).
2. See Barnett & Greenberg, A Proposal for Wired City Television, 1968 WASH.
L.Q. 1; Simmons, The Fairness Doctrine and Cable TV, 11 HARV. J. LEGIs. 628, 640-
47 (1974).
3. 47 C.F.R. § 76.209(a) (1975) provides: "A cable television system engaging in
origination cablecasting shall afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of con-
flicting views on issues of public importance."
4. For an extensive discussion of the doctrine and its development, see Simmons,
supra note 2, at 630-36.
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sial issue of public importance cover all aspects of the issue fairly. 5 The
initial duty to carry out the doctrine rests upon the broadcaster, who has
both the discretion to determine fair coverage" and the obligation to afford
free access to broadcast time if paid sponsorship is unavailable. 7 Second,
there are a series of special rules.8 These require that in the case of a per-
sonal attack on an individual,0 editorial endorsement of a candidate,10 or the
appearance of a person in support of a candidate within section 315 of the
Communications Act,1 ' an offer or a reasonable opportunity to respond' 2
be afforded the affected party.
Only the personal attack and editorial reply rules have been specifically
approved by the United States Supreme Court.1 These rules involve basic
and important elements of equity for both the individual and the political
candidate.' 4 Depending upon the structure of cable communications, how-
ever, a somewhat different treatment might be given them than that required
by general fairness obligations.
While the degree of government involvement and the legal justification for
such intervention may depend upon the industry structure, the underlying
theory is the same for cable as it is for broadcasting.' 5 If the ownership of
the cable system and conrtol of programming rest in the same entity, the
scope for government action will be greater and its legal basis stronger. But
if a cable system's ownership and program control are separated, the degree
5. See Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1255
(1949).
6. id.; cf. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 1971)
(constitutionality of prime time access rule upheld).
7. See Letter to Cullman Broadcasting Co., Inc., Sept. 18, 1963, reprinted in 40
F.C.C. 576, 577 (1970).
8. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970); 47 C.F.R. § 76.209(d) (1975). Both rules
require equal opportunity for candidates. For a brief discussion of this area, see p. 852.
9. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123(a) (1975) (broadcasting); 47 C.F.R. § 76.209(b) (1975)
(cable).
10. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123(c) (1975) (broadcasting); 47 C.F.R. § 76.209(d) (1975)
(cable).
11. See Letter to Nicholas Zapple, June 3, 1970, reprinted in 23 F.C.C.2d 707
(1970).
12. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1975); 47 C.F.R. § 76.209 (1975).
13. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). But see Citizens
Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974), in which Chief
Judge Bazelon suggests reappraisal of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies rationale for
radio and television regulation. Id. at 274-75 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
14. The matter is important also to the entire political system. See discussion of
the Meiklejohn theory, notes 24-36 and accompanying text infra.
15. See discussion of United States v. Midwest Video Corp., notes 56-58 and accom-
panying text inIra.
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of individual power will be less, correspondingly weakening the legal justifi-
cation for governmental regulation. 16 In either situation, during a transition
period prior to the full development of a cable's potential, the scarcity and
ancillary service concepts17 will continue to support the application of the
fairness doctrine to cable.' 8 Thereafter, any theory supporting the doctrine
must center primarily upon the right of the viewer to receive suitable news,
entertainment, public affairs, and aesthetic experiences.' 9
There must be a balance of first amendment related rights if the fairness
doctrine is -to be retained for cablecasting.20 Thus, an initial inquiry must
consider the case law and theory of the rights of the viewing public, the
individuals directly affected, and the media, the latter both as businessmen
and as journalists. The status of first amendment -theory in mass communica-
tions, however, is such that although some guidance is available, it cannot
provide definitive answers. Accordingly, other matters more peripheral to the
first amendment must be turned to for a determination of the place of
the fairness doctrine in cable communications. There are several converging
factors. The primary one is that under the first amendment not only the
broadcaster, but also the viewer, ought to receive affirmative protection.21
Accordingly, while the broadcaster has important rights which warrant
protection, including his own first amendment rights, controls such as the
fairness doctrine are permissible to protect the viewer.
Other concepts are also important. Cablecasting is presently consid-
ered an ancillary or supplemental service to over-4he-air broadcasting. 22 As
such, like over-the-air broadcasting, it is bound -to follow the fairness doctrine
16. See CABINET CoMMITrEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CABLE, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 37-38 (1974). Cooperative ownership is an alternative possibility. How-
ever, with one segment of the community controlling such an undertaking, the basic fair-
ness problem would remain.
17. See notes 52-58 and accompanying text infra.
18. See CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 16, at 54.
19. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
20. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
in which Chief Judge Bazelon stated:
Since the principle that a multitude of voices will produce a multitude of ideas
is at bottom premised on free entry into the media of communication, that
principle must be re-examined to insure that the process of limitation of entry
does not itself deny the First Amendment rights of those who might otherwise
speak through the scarce media.
Id. at 274 (emphasis in original).
21. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). "It is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." id.
at 390.
22. For a description of the functions of cable television, see United States v. South-
western Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 163 (1968).
1975]
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once programs are originated. 'Because of the pervasive, immediate nature of
the electronic media and the extreme impact caused by its vividness, 23 the
regulation of electronic communication, whether over-the-air or cable, must
be undertaken. Indeed, because of its potentially greater range of services,
cable's impact may be even greater than that of over-the-air transmissions,
and perhaps should be more carefully scrutinized. Furthermore, since the
individual franchises of cable are natural monopolies granted by the state, a
determination must be made as to whether they are instruments of state
action.
I. THE VIEWER'S RIGHT
The contemporary concept of the viewer's right of access to in-
formation derives largely from the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn.2 4
Criticizing the clear and present danger doctrine enunciated by Justices
Holmes and Brandeis and developed by the Supreme Court, Meiklejohn
takes the position that all speech necessary for informed self-government is
protected,25 and that "[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak,
but that everything worth saying shall be said. '2 6 This conclusion is reached
through a twofold analysis. First, Meiklejohn reasons that a textual reading
of the first amendment forbids only abridgement of freedom of speech, not
of speech itself.27 This concept of freedom embraces and is limited to self-
government. 28 Second, he relies heavily on the immunity in speech and de-
bate afforded members of Congress, urging that they are in fact acting for the
larger body politic. By analogy, this larger body, which encompasses all
citizens, enjoys the same right to speak on any subject involving governmen-
tal issues.29 He pointedly observes that radio did not merit first amendment
protection because it did not foster political debate. Rather, it was regarded
as a commercial and entertainment venture, which should receive only due
process protection under the fifth amendment.80 The Meiklejohn view
23. See notes 59-72 and accompanying text inIra.
24. E.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948); Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
25. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 29-50 (1960). Although Meiklejohn's
views were originally believed to be limited to political material, he later clarified his
position to include aesthetic and social materials which provide insight into the nature
of man.
26. Id. at 26.
27. Id. at 19-21.
28. Id. at 24-28.
29. Id. at 35-36.
30. Id. at 86-88.
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initially did not command an overwhelming following or majority accept-
ance; however, it was influential in the period that followed. 1
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,32 the Meildejohn theory became a
center point of constitutional debate on the first amendment. The language of
the decision suggesting that there exists a "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open"3 3 was viewed by some commentators as an adoption of the
Meiklejohn theory.8 4 Whether this view was shared by the majority of the
Court is hard to say; in any case, it had entered constitutional jurisprudence.
The Meiklejohn theory is fully consistent with the only Supreme Court
opinion on the fairness doctrine, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,35 in
which the Court found the right of viewers to be paramount: "It is the
ight of the public to receive suitable access to social, pohtical, aesthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial. . . . That right
may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC." 6
The 'broadcast-viewing public, then, is given a substantial right under the
first amendment to receive differing ideas in an uninhibited marketplace.
The other side of the balance, however, has been set forth in two cases in
which efforts were made to expand the citizen's right from one that involved
a fair presentation of controversial issues to one that involved an individual's
access to the media.8 7 These cases made it clear that there were values other
than those of the viewer or reader involved, including the constitutionally
protected right of editorial freedom in the media.
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Commit-
tee,8 8 the issue was whether or not a broadcaster was precluded by
either the Communications Act of 193489 or the first amendment from
31. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 n.5 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (criticism of the Meiklejohn view); Chafee, Book Review, 62 HAtv. L.
REV. 891 (1949).
32. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. Id. at 270.
34. See, e.g., Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191. In 1964, Justice Brennan, the author
of New York Times, implied that perhaps Meiklejohn's views have prevailed. See Bren-
nan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79
HAv. L. REv. 1, 10-20 (1965).
35. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
36. Id. at 390.
37. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973) (broadcasting access); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (newspaper access).
38. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
39. 47 U.S.C. § 151-609 (1970).
1975]
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refusing to sell broadcast time to people who wished to express certain views.
After analyzing the legislative history of the Communications Act and
the relationship of the broadcast industry to the Federal Communications
Commission, the Court found that Congress intended to avoid excessive
government involvement in the industry's operation." Without resolving the
question of whether access could be compelled in the electronic media by
rule or statute, the Court found neither a legislative intent within the Com-
munications Act compelling such access nor a constitutional right mandating
access to advertising time. In so doing, the Court looked at the conflioting
needs of the public, the individual and the broadcaster. The Court found a
need to protect the professional discretion of the broadcast journalist in the
absence of a legislative mandate to the contrary4' and it emphasized its view
that under the proposed right-of-access system, government involvement in
broadcasting would become too great.4 2 The Court found that journalistic
freedom conferred a greater benefit upon society than would a right-of-
access, stating: "Regimenting broadcasters is too radical a theory for the
ailment respondents complain of. '"48
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,44 the Court was faced with a
poorly drafted Florida criminal statute of early 20th century vintage which
gave a right of reply, without cost, to a political candidate attacked by a
newspaper. Although the Court noted -the relative concentration of control of
media today as compared to earlier times,4 5 it found that such concentration
of control was not sufficient reason to compel a newspaper to print material
which it did not see fit to print.46 Despite assertions that the newspaper
would not be hampered in choosing what to publish, but would only be re-
quired to achieve balance,47 thus arguably furthering the first amend-
ment rights of the public and the individual attacked, the Court found
countervailing values. The impact on the publisher was of great concern,
including the fact that at least some costs were involved.4 8 Further, com-
pelled publication might impose a chilling effect upon the publisher. Such an
effect would be detrimental to the public interest. 40 After building these bases
40. 412 U.S. at 105-10. The Court declared that "Congress intended to permit pri-
vate broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its pub-
lic obligations." Id. at 110.
41. Id. at 121, 124-25.
42. Id. at 126-27.
43. Id. at 127.
44. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
45. Id. at 248-54.
46. Id. at 254-58.
47. See id. at 256.
48. Id. at 256-57.
49. See id. at 257.
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of possible public harm, the Court placed ultimate reliance on a journalistic
discretion rationale. 0
By reconciling the various opinions of Democratic National Committee,5'
however, Tornillo did make clear the idea that different media might
be treated differently to ensure first amendment freedoms. Thus,
while the statute under consideration in Tornillo had an effect similar to
that of the fairness doctrine, the declaration that the statute was unconstitu-
tional does not impair the doctrine in broadcasting or resolve its future in
cable. It does establish, however, that in a first amendment balance, journal-
istic discretion is to be given substantial weight. It is not eclipsed by the
right of the public set forth in Red Lion; neither are the rights of the public,
and, by implication, the individual, rejected. Since these cases did not setle
the general problem of first amendment media theory, other factors beyond
this balance must be considered in order to resolve the particular problem
of the fairness doctrine in cable communications. These factors include the
nature of cable television; the impact of television, and cable television, on
the viewing public; the issue of whether or not cable is an instrument of state
action; and a determination of who has program control in cable communica-
tions.
III. CABLE AS A SERVICE ANCILLARY TO BROADCAST TELEVISION
The FCC's current regulatory authority over cable is based upon the
theory that such regulation is "reasonably ancillary to the effective perform-
ance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of
television broadcasting,"'52 and upon the general authority over wire commu-
nications provided for in the Communications Act. 58 In regard to the
fairness doctrine, the first is far more important to the present stage of cable
and its future industry structure.
50. The Court concluded:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment,
and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the deci-
sions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment
of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the ex-
ercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
First Amendment guarantees. ...
Id. at 258.
51. In Democratic National Committee, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented.
The Miami Herald opinion was unanimous.
52. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). For a
critique of the ancillary service concept, see Simmons, supra note 2, at 648-53.
53. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970) provides in part: "[T]he provisions of this chapter
shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio. . ....
19751
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After the successful assertion of jurisdiction over cable, the FCC imposed
a rule requiring the origination of programming by cable systems having
more than 3,500 subscribers. 54 The policy statement establishing this require-
ment is the source of the present application of the fairness doctrine to
cable.5  Although the program origination requirement was ultimately
abandoned, the fairness doctrine remains applicable to voluntarily originated
cable programming. As a service that the FCC and the courts appeared to
deem ancillary to broadcasting, cable became subject to the same varied first
amendment treatment as the over-the-air media.
The cable program origination requirement was upheld by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Midwest Video Corp.56 Although this was only a
plurality decision, 57 -the four dissenting justices agreed that if a cable system
determines to enter into program origination, then, like broadcasting, it is
subject to FCC regulation of its programs.5 8 The position of the dissent, read
with the plurality and concurring opinions which permit the FCC to compel
program origination, makes clear that as long as cable is functioning as a
service ancillary to regular broadcast stations through program origination,
cable may be subject to the same program regulation as over-the-air
broadcasting, including the fairness doctrine.
IV. THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION
Control over television program content is sought in part because many
people regard its impact on the thought and action processes of society to be
extensive.5 9 This belief contains elements of truth, informed conjecture, and
mythology. In any event, the degree of impact does not lend itself to empiri-
cal ascertainment.60 Structuring research beyond 'the gathering of data on
54. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201 (1974), deleted, 39 Fed. Reg. 43310 (1974).
55. First Report and Order on CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 218-22 (1969) (fairness
doctrine and reply rules applicable to originated cable programming).
56. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
57. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion and was joined by Justices White, Marshall
and Blackmun. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result and Justice Douglas, joined
by Justices Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist, dissented.
58. 406 U.S. at 680 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
59. Marshall McLuhan suggests that the very nature of the media causes it to have
tremendous impact on society. See M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTEN-
SIONS OF MAN (1964). His writings, however, which are based on historical knowledge
and analysis of contemporary society, are supported by a paucity of empirical data. His
writings are lucid and persuasive, but they provide no more than the basic thesis that
television may have an exceptional role in society.
60. See, e.g., Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass
Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REV. 1, 16-22 (1973). See also
Comment, Power in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Fairness Doctrine and the First
Amendment, 52 TEx. L. REV. 727, 753-57 (1974).
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the number of people television reaches and the amount of time they watch
television per day is difficult. Surveys can include a question as to the effect
of television on survey participants, but the answers provide no more than a
starting point for an inquiry into the impact of television. Moreover, given
the faot that our society is saturated by television, it is virtually impossible
to set up an experiment that would isolate television as a factor. The very
effort at isolation would itself be a distorting variable.,'
The starting point must be, however, what we do know. First, television
has a near captive audience.0 2 It is both immediate and vivid. Coverage of the
civil disorders of the 1960's, the moon expeditions, the Vietnam War, and
Watergate was brought into American homes with a vividness and quickness
unmatched by other media. But while a picture may be worth a thousand
words and thus accentuate the impact of television, it conveys relatively little
verbal information about the news covered and it is verbal information
which provides the preferred basis for political and social decisionmaking.
Second, a majority of Americans rely on televistion as their primary source
of information."5 While not restricted to lower socioeconomic groups, this
phenomenon is particularly associated with them. Presumably, these groups
have less access to other sources of information and need a higher degree
of protection against 'the influence of television than do higher socioeconomic
groups.
Finally, some social science researchers have developed the theory that tele-
vision viewers are likely to select those aspects of public affairs programming
which reinforce their preexisting views.0 4 In the context of elections, research
suggests that television has little effect on the vote. 5 It should be noted,
61. People who do not watch a great deal of television are too atypical to serve as
a control factor. Likewise, temporary deprivation introduces the variable of deprivation,
while testing immediately after viewing introduces the variable of special viewing. Some
conclusions might be drawn from people who ordinarily watch either a great deal of tele-
vision or very little television, but in both cases controls would be absent and neither
group could be identified as typical. Rather, a cross section of viewers with various hab-
its would be required, checked by a control group, if such a group could be found.
62. While clearly capable of escaping television, the audience ordinarily does not do
so, partly because the viewing entails no direct costs, at least for people who have access
to a television.
63. See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. MCCOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REG-
ULATION 13-14, 40 (1973). See also Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broad-
caster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768 (1972).
64. See, e.g., K. LANG & G. LANG, POLITICS AND TELEVISION 15-16 (1969).
65. Jaffe, supra note 63, at 769-70. In another area in which the effect of television
has been studied, that of violence, evidence suggests that those predisposed to violent
activity were moved to such conduct by what they viewed on television; the evidence
on this correlation, however, is far from conclusive. See SURGEON GENERAL'S Sol-
19751
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however, that advertisers and political candidates prefer television over other
media. This preference may flow either from its effect or from its ability to
reach large numbers of people. Television is an important information
source, but it is only part of a matrix of the communication of ideas. 66
Since the impact of television on society has not been clearly established,
an inquiry into the authority of Congress and the FCC to respond, through
rules such as the fairness doctrine, to the alleged impact is difficult. This situ-
ation is similar to that regarding obscenity after the issuance of The Report ol
the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography.67 The report, based upon
substantial social science inquiry, determined that on the basis of present
knowledge it was impossible to support -the conclusion that pornography
causes antisocial conduct. The Hill-Link minority report, based upon much
thinner research and more speculative reasoning, concluded that antisocial
conduct was probably exacerbated by exposure to pornography.6 8 In Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,69 the Supreme Court nevertheless cited the Hill-
Link minority report in reaching the conclusion that obscenity could be reg-
ulated even for audiences of consenting adults. 70 The Court indicated, how-
ever, that although legislatures must act upon unproved assumptions (given
the imperfect nature of human knowledge), the judiciary ought not to inter-
vene if -there is the barest support for a legislative determination.71
Similarly, in the area of the fairness doctrine, since regulatory authori-
ty has been delegated to -the FCC, the judiciary should follow the well-
established doctrine that administrative determinations will be afforded great
ENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, TELEVISION AND
GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE 110-11 (1972).
66. See, Jaffe, The Fairness Doctrine, Equal Time, Reply to Personal Attacks, and
the Local Service Obligation: Implications of Technological Change, 37 U. CINN. L.
REV. 550 (1968). The author states:
Public thinking, communication, and ultimately discussion making [sic] on a
"controversial issue of public importance" is not a matter of a broadcast or of
something heard or read here or there. It is a social process in which all of
the media of communication (the informal, personal ones may be the most im-
portant) play a role. To isolate the role of television and provide a special
rule for its participation seems to me questionable.
Id. at 554.
67. COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970).
68. Id. at 383-424 (minority report).
69. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
70. Id. at 57-70 & n.8.
71. The Court stated: "It is not for us to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying
state legislation, save in the exceptional case where that legislation plainly impinges
upon rights protected by the Constitution itself." Id. at 60.
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deference in areas of agency expertise.72 Accordingly, the FCC's evaluation
of the impact of television upon society and the appropriate balance of first
amendment rights among individuals, the public, and television or cable
operators should prevail.
V. GOVERNMENT ACTION
73
In considering cable and its relationship to government action, the
similarity of cable to public utilities, the extent of government approval of
cable systems, and cable's natural monopoly status must all be consid-
ered. Additionally, the general concept of the doctrine of government action
must be examined.
The question of whether the regulation of cable communications cloaks
the industry in government action begins with an examination of Public
Utilities Commission v. Pollak74 and its subsequent interpretation. 75 In
Pollak, the District of Columbia Public Utilities Commission had approved
the broadcast of radio programs on buses and streetcars belonging to Capital
Transit. Capital Transit, a privately owned utility company operated under a
franchise from Congress and subject to regulation by the Public Utilities
Commission, enjoyed a virtual monopoly of bus and streetcar services in the
District of Columbia. Although the Court held -that the broadcast of the radio
programs did not violate the petitioners' fifth amendment right of privacy, 76
it did find "a sufficiently close relationship between the Federal Government
and the radio service to make it necessary . . . to consider [the amend-
ment]."77
72. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.11 (1958).
73. The term "government action" as used in this article is equivalent to state action.
In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114
(1973), Chief Justice Burger used the term "governmental action" extensively.
74. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
75. E.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
76. Petitioners relied only on the fifth amendment in asserting a right of privacy.
77. 343 U.S. at 462. The Court stated:
In finding this relation we do not rely on the mere fact that Capital Transit
operates a public utility on the streets of the District of Columbia under au-
thority of Congress. Nor do we rely upon the fact that, by reason of such
federal authorization, Capital Transit now enjoys a substantial monopoly of
street railway and bus transportation in the District of Columbia. We do,
however, recognize that Capital Transit operates its service under the regula-
tory supervision of the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia
which is an agency authorized by Congress. We rely particularly upon the fact
that that agency, pursuant to protests against the radio program, ordered an
investigation of it and, after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation
1975]
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In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Commit-
tee,78 Chief Justice Burger discussed the issue of whether a broadcast
licensee's refusal to accept a paid editorial advertisement constituted govern-
ment action for first amendment purposes.7 9 After finding no partnership
between CBS and the government ° despite the high degree of regulation,
the Chief Justice distinguished Pollak:
Here, Congress has not established a regulatory scheme for
broadcast licensees as pervasive as the regulation of public trans-
portation in Pollak. More important, as we have noted, Congress
has affirmatively indicated in the Communications Act that certain
journalistic decisions are for the licensee, subject only to the restric-
tions imposed by evaluation of its overall performance under the
public interest standard. In Pollak there was no suggestion that
Congress had considered worthy of protection the carrier's interest
in exercising discretion over the content of communications forced
on passengers. A more basic distinction, perhaps, between Pollak
and this case is that Pollak was concerned with a transportation
utility that itself derives no protection from the First Amendment.81
The dissent in Democratic National Committee analyzed the government
action theory and Pollak in greater detail. Noting that the airwaves are in the
public domain by statute,82 and observing that "tlhere can be no doubt
that, for the industry as a whole, governmental regulation alone makes 'radio
communication possible by . . . limiting the number of licenses so as not to
overcrowd the spectrum,' ",83 the dissenters found that there did exist exten-
sive government control over the broadcast industry. In their view, it was
because of this regulatory control and because of the "obvious nexus between
the Commission's Fairness Doctrine and the absolute refusal of broadcast
licensees to sell any part of their air time to groups or individuals wishing to
speak out on controversial issues," 84 that there existed government action.
The dissenters rejected the plurality's opinion that the fairness doctrine by it-
dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and convenience were
not impaired thereby.
Id. (footnote omitted).
78. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
79. In this part of the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist.
80. 412 U.S. at 119.
81. Id. at 120. The Chief Justice emphasized that the "concept of journalistic inde-
pendence could not co-exist with a reading of the challenged conduct of the licensee as
governmental action." Id. at 121.
82. Id. at 173-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
83. Id. at 175.
84. Id. at 177.
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self was sufficient to protect the public's first amendment rights. Additional-
ly, the dissenters found Pollack to be controlling.8 5 The argument of the dis-
sent is more persuasive than that of the majority and ought to be accepted.
Nevertheless, the argument of the dissent needs to be rephrased. The
phenomenon of interference creates a situation where government interven-
tion is essential to the existence of a broadcast industry. The result is that
regulation substitutes scarcity for chaos. Thus, it follows that the government
must choose among the candidates for the limited number of available
licenses. 80 The licensees then come into a relationship with the government
similar to that of the natural monopoly of Pollak, even though the licensees
have only quasi-monopolies. The broadcast license is as surely chosen by the
government as any public utility monopoly, and thus is entangled in govern-
ment action at least to the same extent as Capital Transit was in Pollak.87
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co."" greatly clarified the position of the
majority of the Court concerning state action, public utilities, and its
interpretation of Pollak. In that case, the termination of electrical service
without notice or hearing was challenged as a deprivation of due process. In
holding for the utility company, the Court found that Pollak rejected any reli-
85. Justice Brennan stated:
Indeed, the argument for finding "governmental action" here is even stronger
than in Pollak, for this case concerns, not an incidental activity of a bus com-
pany, but, rather, the primary activity of the regulated entities-communica-
tion.
Id. at 180 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. The Democratic National Committee dissenters made this point in arguing that
there was governmental action. Id. at 197-98.
87. This argument, however sound theoretically, is faced with the pragmatic thrust
of another theory of relationships, best illustrated in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Amalgamated Food Employees, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968), and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). In Marsh, a company
town was found to be the functional equivalent of the downtown area of a city and thus
first amendment rights were protected even though the private property owners objected
to the dissemination of religious literature. Logan Valley extended the doctrine to labor
picketing at a relatively small shopping center when there was an absence of other ef-
fective means of reaching the pertinent audience and a direct connection to the business
center. In Tanner, a large shopping mall was the focal point. The Court found
that anti-Vietnam War protesters had no right to pass out leaflets, in part because the
mall was not the functional equivalent of a downtown area, and in part because there
were other means by which the protesters could disseminate their materials. In Tanner,
and to a degree in Democratic National Committee, the Court shifted toward weighing
private property rights more heavily than such individual rights as speech and political
activity. A continuation of such a shift would jeopardize concepts such as the fairness
doctrine unless the fairness doctrine continues to be buttressed by concepts such as
scarcity, legislative intent and judicial approval. Since these are at best watered down
in cable communications, the philosophical shift toward private property rights brings
into doubt the continuing viability of the fairness doctrine.
88. 419 U.S. 345 (1974), noted in 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 622 (1975).
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ance upon the monopoly status of Capital Transit in finding government ac-
tion,89 and questioned whether government action had even been found in Pol-
lak.90 The Court suggested that Pollak may have assumed state action only
arguendo -to dispose of the case on first amendment grounds.01 In Jackson,
the Court refused to ground state action on the essential nature of the
services rendered, suggesting that such an expansion would be both open-
ended and a substantial intrusion into traditionally private affairs. 92
The decision in Jackson left open three broad areas for finding state
action in cable. First, a symbiotic "joint ownership" such as that found in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority93 might be found. Second, if the
private party performs an essentially public function (such as elections, or
operation of a public park or a company town), 94 or in the case of a utility,
exercises a particular power of the state (such as eminent domain), govern-
ment action would exist.95 Third, in a Pollak situation in which the imprima-
tur of the state actively promotes the policy under scrutiny, governmental
action may exist. 96
Thus, regulation of cable communications should be considered govern-
ment action. Cable communications constitute the same natural monopoly97
as Capital Transit did in Pollak, and have the same dependence upon a gov-
ernment sanction to operate as the broadcasting industry. As a franchise, cable
has the right not only to use public property, as in Pollak, but also to utilize
private property.9 s
Finally, under the option of continuing cable as part of an integrated over-
the-air broadcast system in which cable has many of the attributes of an
ancillary service, the rules of broadcasting will apply, further deepening
government involvement. 9 However, if the option of recasting cable as a
89. 419 U.S. at 352.
90. Id. at 356.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 352-54. But see id. at 361-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In Burton, the Court held that the refusal of service to
a black by the owner of a restaurant which was physically and financially an integral
part of a public building, constituted state action. The Court found that the state had
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the restaurant that it had
a joint participation in the enterprise. Id. at 725. Burton is clearly accepted, not over-
turned, by Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-51.
94. See note 87 supra.
95. See 419 U.S. at 352-53.
96. See id. at 356-57.
97. For the Court's definition of a natural monopoly, see id. at 351 n.8.
98. Cable must pass over private property and often utilizes poles owned by telephone
or electric companies.
99. See notes 52-58 and accompanying text supra.
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common carrier is chosen, it would become a utility like other common
carriers and fall within Pollak as to permissible regulation. 100 Additionally,
the thrust of regulation would determine the programming system, thus
giving to it the imprimatur of government approval. 101
VI. PROGRAMMING CONTROL
The determination of who has program control in cable communications is
extremely important to the existence of the fairness doctrine in cable. To the
extent that cable is utilized as an ancillary service or is integrated into a
scheme of communication in which the system owners, like over-the-air li-
censees, determine program content, the doctrine will apply.' 0 2
Control of program content, however, need not rest with the system
owner. Presently that control is reduced somewhat by public access channels,
government channels, and educational channels. A 1973 report to the
President by a special cabinet committee headed by Clay Whitehead,
Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, proposed a division of
system ownership and program control in each market. 03 After a transition
period, the system could operate its channels on a common carrier basis with
some possible qualifications. 04 During the transition period before the cable
communication system begins to partake of the attributes of common carriers
in a substantial way,105 the fairness doctrine should be applied. Thereafter
four problems would remain: how to treat over-the-air transmissions
purchased by cable channels for broadcast over the cable system; what
policy is appropriate for channels retained by the cable system owner;
how the content of common carrier access channels should be controlled, if
at all, and how problems such as personal attack and official issues will be
100. The FCC, however, has rejected common carrier status for cable. 39 Fed. Reg.
43308 (1974). The Commission stated that "it would be premature to place cable tele-
vision in the mold of common carrier regulation." Id.
101. This conclusion is based on the author's view of Democratic National Commit-
tee. The counterargument to this theory is that the approving government entity will
concern itself only with the general structure of the industry, not with particular pro-
grams. Thus, as in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), in which it was
held that the lodge was not exercising state action when it enforced its bylaws, but that
the Pennsylvania requirement that organizations enforce their bylaws exceeded the per-
missible bounds of state involvement, here too, it can be argued that only the general
policy is approved, not a specific one. A contrary result would be the preferred one.
102. See notes 52-58 & accompanying text supra.
103. CABINET COMMITrEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 16, at 29-39.
104. Id. at 29-30.
105, Id. at 51-61. Determination of the exact point at which such an arrangement
would cease being service ancillary to broadcasting and become a separate communica-
tion entity would have to await its actual development.
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met. While ultimately an empirical approach will be necessary to resolve
'these questions, some suggestions may be postulated.
Over-the-air broadcasts will remain powerful vehicles of mass communica-
tion even after common carrier cable systems are established. We will
probably not become a wired nation for decades despite a theoretical
capacity to proceed more rapidly. 10 Because over-the-air broadcasters will
retain a dominant position in television programming, it will remain neces-
sary for cable systems to carry their programming to retain viability.
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the relationship between
broadcaster and viewer will change.107 Accordingly, the broadcasts them-
selves will remain subject to the fairness doctrine. A potential problem arises
if a cable system operator who carries such broadcasts as an inducement to
subscriptions deletes certain portions of the broadcasts and thus creates a
fairness inbalance, as occurred when a local licensee deleted pro-civil rights
materials from its network programming in a leading fairness doctrine
case.108 The argument exists that as to cable subscribers, as distinct from
over-the-air viewers, there exists no scarcity; therefore, balance can be
achieved by those who wish to present a minority view by hiring the common
carrier access channels. However, this overlooks the fact that viewers might
opt primarily for the cable carriage of over-the-air broadcasts. 0 9 Assuming
this, the first amendment right of the viewer to access to information, the
diluted but remaining ancillary nature of the service, the especially great
impact of the over-the-air programs, and the extent of government entangle-
ment in both cable and over-the-air broadcasting combine to render a differ-
ent result unavoidable. The cable system operator must be required to carry
all programming of any over-the-air broadcaster carried in part,110 and thus
be as subject as the traditional broadcaster to the fairness doctrine.
The problems regarding channels reserved to the cable system operator
present a different framework for analysis. A multitude of reasons for the
106. Despite early projections of rapid growth, such growth has not yet been realized
and the present economic situation does not suggest a bright future.
107. However, the aspect of scarcity will continue to affect over-the-air broadcasters.
108. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
109. This assumes that the present fare is what a majority actually want. Of course,
some diversity is to be expected and will develop among those who want another choice.
See Citizens to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see the Na-
tional Cable Television Association's data on the low level of audience response to "com-
munity-oriented" originated programming, summarized at 39 Fed. Reg. 43303 (1974).
110. It is possible the carriage would be required in any case, whether utilized as a
means to gain viewers or because the broadcaster would purchase all of the time of a
common carrier channel.
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choice of reserving a channel could exist. At one extreme, it could be
reserved as a propaganda channel for the system owner's viewpoints, to be
subsidized by profits from the remainder of the system or other enterprises.
In part, this was the motive in the broadcasting activities of the only licensee
whose license the FCC ever refused to renew (without judicial prodding) for
violations of the fairness doctrine.""' At the other extreme, the channel
could be operated as a purely commercial undertaking, perhaps even
providing the margin of profit needed by a system operator. It is more likely
that reasons for the reservation of a channel would be mixed. Desires for
self-expression and the opportunities to engage in journalism as well as to
make a profit would probably be involved. Thus, in most circumstances
reliance could rest on the mixed motives of the system operator, the required
balance of the over-the-air programs carried, and the availability of access
via common carrier channels. Yet extreme situations could develop, as they
have in the present scheme of broadcasting.1 2 These could be met by
applying a diluted fairness doctrine. Since there are alternate, albeit imper-
fect, electronic sources of information, the doctrine should be applied only in
the more extreme circumstances. The doctrine might be refashioned to
require that cable system broadcasters provide dissenting views when the
original presentation is clearly unfair and concerns a controversial issue of
great public importance."13 It should not be applied unless substantial
abuses which threaten the public interest by creating major distortions
develop. Additionally, replies under the personal attack rule," 4 the editorial
rule,"15 the Zapple doctrine,"" and, by extension, section 315 of the
Communications Act," 7 should be required.
Finally, the common carrier access channels present their own problems.
At the outset, the hypothesis advanced in Democratic National Committee,
that wealthy purchasers of time might monopolize access time, must be met.
In that case, the Court addressed rules suggested by the District of
111. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), aff'd, 473 F.2d
16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). The FCC grounded its decision
upon both the fairness doctrine and misrepresentation grounds. Although discussing the
fairness problem in detail, the Court of Appeals based its affirmance on the misrepre-
sentation issue. Unlike Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the FCC in Brandywine looked to the fairness is-
sue without judicial urging.
112. See notes 108 & 111 and accompanying text supra.
113. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.209(a) (1975) (applying the fairness doctrine to cable); Re-
port on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
114. 47 C.F.R. § 76.209(b) (1975).
115. Id. § 76.209(c).
116. See note 11 supra.
117. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
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Columbia Court of Appeals and by a member of the FCC which
would have permitted some limited periods of access. 118 In a cable common
carrier system, the 'time available would not be functionally limited if a
reasonable number of technically available channels were developed.1 19 If
the rule structure required this, it would generally eliminate the spectre of
the very wealthy dominating all the time available. While moneyed causes
might gain an advantage, that advantage can be counterbalanced if the oppo-
site viewpoints are supported by committed individuals.
However, in a handful of situations involving issues of overriding public in-
terest, a serious financial imbalance may occur and thereby engender un-
fairness. This problem has been central to the fairness doctrine since Banzhaf
v. FCC,120 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit found ,that the public interest in health brought cigarette
advertising within the ambit of the fairness doctrine. Subsequently, Banzhal's
original limitation to cigarettes has been expanded to include pollution 21
and several other areas.' 22 The appropriate remedy is elusive. While cigarette
advertising might be banned, as in broadcasting, 23 the entire problem cannot
be handled in this way. Consider the importance of discussion of the interrela-
tionship of pollution abatement, the energy problem and inflation. It is con-
ceivable that only the view of 'the corporate giants might be presented fully if
the fairness doctrine were not applicable. While the environmental and other
groups would have some funds to broadcast their views, their treasuries are
limited.
118. 412 U.S. at 123-24.
119. Presently, systems of 20 or more channels are operating. Like all resources,
however, cable channels at some point have a finite limit. Unlike over-the-air broad-
casting, this limit probably exceeds actual demand. Thus, there exists no real scarcity.
120. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). The court
found that because of the seriousness of the problem, it was "not an abuse of discretion
for the Commission to attempt to insure not only that the negative view be heard, but
that it be heard repeatedly." Id. at 1099.
121. See Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
122. See, e.g., Retail Store Employees Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (labor dispute); Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (military recruit-
ment). The success has been limited, however. The cause was remanded in Retail
Store Employees and the FCC's rejection of a fairness problem in Green was affirmed.
Nevertheless, the cases demonstrate the scope of potential controversy over the doctrine.
The issue of energy-related advertising has also caused concern in the broadcast industry
since it is the type of area to which the fairness doctrine may apply. See, e.g., Brown,
Networks Reject Mobil Equal Ad Plan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974, at 1, col. 2 (city
ed.).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (Supp. III, 1973). The constitutionality of the ban was up-
held in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aft'd,
405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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Thus Mobil Oil, which undertook an intensive print media campaign ex-
plaining its view of the energy crisis in early 1974, offered to pay not
only for advertisements for its own position but also for responses on
television. 124 The purpose of this offer was to relieve the broadcaster of any
financial burden under the Cullman doctrine. 1 25 The networks refused the
offer, presumably to avoid any dilution of their editorial control of pres-
entations. This rationale would not be viable in a first come, first served
common carrier situation. The result here might be to so skew the public's
first amendment right to information,' 26 particularly given the importance
of television as a source of information and its substantial impact, as to
make the application of a diluted fairness doctrine to common carrier access
cable channels the better solution for extremely important issues. Addition-
ally, precisely the same situation exists in the theoretically abundant
print media, 1 27 where newspapers either accept all editorial advertise-
ments which meet their established criteria or pick and choose as they
wish. 128 In this form of programming arrangement, the ancillary service
rationale would disappear. The government obligation would be fulfilled
by providing a viable common carrier system, as is the case with other
common carrier communication systems. The impact of television, while
remaining a source of concern, would hopefully be resolved by market forces
within the first come, first served arrangement, and would be subject to
continuing scrutiny of actual performance. Accordingly, for most issues the
fairness doctrine would not be applicable to the access channels, unless
actual experience demonstrated a need for its application.
Two special problems would remain, however. First, the problem of
personal attack exists.' 29 Assuming that the person attacked will ordinari-
ly be a public figure, recovery under the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 30
124. See Brown, supra note 122.
125. See note 7 supra.
126. See notes 24-37 and accompanying text supra.
127. There are actually fewer newspapers than television stations in most markets
today. The limit, however, is economic, not technological.
128. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
129. See note 114 supra.
130. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Court overturned an Alabama Supreme
Court affirmance of a conviction for libel. The Court held that the first and fourteenth
amendments prohibit
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "ac-
tual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disre-
gard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279-80.
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doctrine will be difficult. Because of the individual's own first amend-
ment interest in responding to an attack, the balance should be struck
for the individual.' 3' An opportunity for response would in fact
promote the robust debate and sharp interchange necessary to the proper
function of the first amendment. Second, for political campaigns, the answer
for access channels seems simple. Because of the vital nature of communica-
tions, and the first amendment rights of the candidate to be heard and of the
electorate to hear, protection is needed. The impact of the media and the
government involvement in franchising is so great that distortion, actual or
perceived, might result. Yet the fullest possible presentation of the issues
is essential to democracy. 132 Applying the Zapple doctrine' 83 and sec-
tion 315 of the Communications Act, 13 4 once access is granted to one
candidate an equal opportunity for access would be required for all candi-
dates for the same office. In this one instance the first come, first served
concept should be abandoned and replying candidates should be given first
preference to the extent necessary to achieve equal treatment.
VII. CONCLUSION
As long as cable communication remains an ancillary or fully integrated
part of the broadcast system, the fairness doctrine will apply. If the desired
evolution of cable occurs, problems will arise. It is possible that a version
of the fairness doctrine should remain. This depends on how the first amend-
ment, the impact of television and the government action doctrine are
viewed. The present philosophy of the courts would regulate the fairness
doctrine to an unconstitutional status in a common carrier arrangement un-
less unusually great deference were shown a contrary statutory or FCC
decision. However, the essential elements in determining the application of
the fairness doctrine under changed circumstances are so open to debate that
a shift in the courts' philosophical position or a strong FCC or legislative
endorsement of the doctrine could -impose it upon cable communication in
131. Reasonable limits must be established. The present personal attack rule re-
quiring that the cable system within a reasonable time notify the person or group
attacked of the time and substance of the attack, see 47 C.F.R. § 76.209(b) (1975),
would have to give way to a requirement that an aggrieved party raise the issue in a
timely manner, perhaps a week, and that the access channel be an appropriate forum
of reply. See Jaffe, note 66 supra, at 552-53, criticizing the choice of forum.
132. See notes 24-37 and accompanying text supra.
133. See note 11 supra.
134. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
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some form no matter what scheme of program carriage is adopted. Properly
considered, the option of imposing the fairness doctrine ought to remain.135
135. Events subsequent to the completion of this article suggest that the fairness
doctrine is undergoing a substantial reappraisal by the Commission. On September 16,
1975, FCC Chairman Richard E. Wiley proposed an experiment in which the Commis-
sion would discontinue enforcement of the fairness doctrine in the larger radio markets.
He reasoned that enforcement of the doctrine was unnecessary in such markets since
the large numbers of commercial radio stations in those areas provided "an extensive
range of viewpoint even with no governmental oversight." Address by Richard E.
Wiley, before the International Radio and Television Society, Inc., Sept. 16, 1975.
Nine days later, the Commission voted five to two to exempt broadcast debates and
on the spot news conferences held by political candidates from the equal time rule.
See Washington Post, Sept. 26, 1975, at A2. Whether further changes will affect the
doctrine and cable television remains to be seen.
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